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MODESTY, OF A SORT, IN THE SETTING OF
PRECEDENTS*
DAVID E. KLEIN**
This Article explores stare decisis from an unusual perspective,
that of a court as it issues a precedent-setting decision rather than
as it confronts existing ones. I ask specifically about the extent to
which precedents would be expected to constrain the
decisionmaking of lower court judges committed to following
them faithfully. After surveying theoretical and methodological
challenges in assessing the constraint imposed by a precedential
decision and laying out a partial framework for the analysis of
decisions along this dimension, I present some preliminary data
comparing Supreme Court decisions across Justices and time.
The Article concludes with suggestions for additional questions
and methodological refinements.
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INTRODUCTION
Much speculation about and early analysis of the Roberts Court
has focused on its treatment of existing precedents, as observers
wonder at what pace it will dismantle what legacy remains of earlier
Courts, especially the Warren and early Burger Courts.' This Article
explores an issue that receives less attention than the treatment of
precedents but is arguably just as important: how a court goes about
creating precedents. I ask specifically about the potential
constraining effect of a court's rulings. To what extent would a
precedent be expected to fetter the discretion of other judges
committed to following precedents faithfully, and can we measure this
potential in a valid and reliable way?
In Part I of the Article, I develop and defend this way of thinking
about a court's lawmaking. In Part II, I analyze various reasons why
one precedent can be more or less constraining than another and
discuss strategies for empirically assessing the amount of constraint
likely to be imposed. Part III presents preliminary data allowing
some comparisons of precedent-setting styles-the Roberts Court
versus previous Courts and individual Justices against each other.
The Article concludes with thoughts about how consequential
different styles of precedent setting are in reality and suggestions for
future research.
I. MAKING LAW MODESTLY
In nominating John Roberts for Chief Justice, President Bush
maintained that Roberts would "strictly apply the Constitution and
laws, not legislate from the bench."2 At their confirmation hearings
Judges Roberts and Alito both promised to eschew judicial activism
and approach the work of judging with modesty, even humility.
Terms like "activism" and "legislating from the bench" are often
employed loosely,3 especially around the time of judicial confirmation
1. In addition to the other Articles in this Symposium, see Ronald Dworkin, The
Supreme Court Phalanx, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 27, 2007, at 92, 96-99, available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/20570 (decrying what Dworkin sees as unacknowledged
overrulings of precedents by the Roberts Court in the 2006 Term).
2. Press Release, The White House, President Announces Judge John Roberts as
Supreme Court Nominee (July 19, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/
07/20050719-7.html.
3. For careful examinations of these terms, see Bradley C. Canon, A Framework for
the Analysis of Judicial Activism, in SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 385,
387-89 (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles Lamb eds., 1982); Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating




hearings. And the nominees' promises covered a good deal of
ground, including giving respect to precedent and the views of other
judges.4 But in describing what they saw as the proper judicial role,
both gave considerable emphasis to their views of how a Supreme
Court Justice should create precedents and made it clear that their
definition of judicial modesty extended to this facet of judging. In
response to Senator Hatch, Judge Alito said:
I think that my philosophy of the way I approached issues is to
try to make sure that I get right what I decide. And that
counsels in favor of not trying to do too much, not trying to
decide questions that are too broad, not trying to decide
questions that don't have to be decided, and not going to
broader grounds for a decision when a narrower ground is
available.5
Judge Roberts repeatedly made statements along the same lines at his
hearings.6
It would be unwise, of course, to read too much into statements
made by a judicial nominee in the course of hearings. And some of
the goals and principles announced by nominees Alito and Roberts
might conflict with each other. In particular, setting a modest
precedent limited to the specific facts of the case before the Court
does little to ensure that precedent guides a court's decisions in future
cases.7 But their statements give us reason to think both of these
4. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. To Be
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 318-19, 492 (2006) [hereinafter Alito Confirmation
Hearing] (statement of Samuel A. Alito, Jr.); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of
John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55-56 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Confirmation Hearing]
(opening statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
5. Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 4, at 343 (statement of Samuel A. Alito,
Jr.).
6. See, e.g., Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 4, at 55-56 (opening statement
of John G. Roberts, Jr.); id. at 550-51 (response of John G. Roberts, Jr. to the written
questions of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.); see also Stephen Henderson & James Kuhnhenn,
Nominee's Emphasis: Restraint; Facing Committee Senators, Roberts Spoke of the
Importance of Precedent and a Sense of Humility, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 13, 2005, at Al.
7. Consider these thoughts from Judge Sykes:
Given the Chief Justice's apparent inclination in favor of rulings that clearly
articulate "what the law is," it seems unlikely that he will be a fan of the weighing-
and-balancing middle-ground compromises that characterize some of the late-
Rehnquist Court's work. When the Chief Justice announced his preference for
narrow decisions as a means of producing greater consensus on the Court, I don't
think he meant "narrow" in the sense of fact-specific rulings that resolve the case
before the Court but do not produce a clear legal rationale.... Also, fact-based
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Justices care about how they make precedent. Furthermore,
observers of the Court have frequently claimed to see differences in
how Justices approach setting precedents. For instance, Justice
O'Connor was widely viewed as unusually averse to broad rules,
writing opinions in ways that often provided little guidance for
deciding future cases.8 Similar claims have been made about Justice
Kennedy.' At the other end of the spectrum is Justice Scalia, who has
forcefully argued in opinions and articles that Justices should decide
cases on the basis of clearly articulated rules in order to impose
constraint both on other judges and themselves.1 0 Reputations for
precedent-setting styles can even attach to whole Courts, with the
Warren Court probably thought of by many as exemplifying a
penchant for immodest rulemaking.
There might be no cause to care whether Roberts and Alito will
be different from other Justices or whether the Roberts Court will be
different from other Courts if the form precedents take did not matter
for the quality and legitimacy of judging. But based on the
confirmation debates, politicians and the media think it matters, and
many academics agree. A good portion of Cass Sunstein's manifesto
for judicial minimalism, One Case at a Time, is aimed at Scalia, with
Sunstein agreeing with the Justice that precedential forms are
consequential but disagreeing vigorously about the desirability of
broad rules.11 In Sunstein's view, while broad rulings are sometimes
justifiable, even necessary, it is usually preferable for judges to
balancing tests tend to enlarge the role of the courts at the expense of the other
branches, and our new Chief Justice seems positively allergic to that.
Diane S. Sykes, "Of a Judiciary Nature": Observations on the Chief Justice's First
Opinions, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1027, 1042 (2007).
8. See, e.g., Wilson Ray Huhn, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Sandra Day
O'Connor: A Refusal to "Foreclose the Unanticipated," 39 AKRON L. REV. 373, 379-84
(2006) (discussing O'Connor's willingness to decide cases based on factual context as
opposed to clearly articulated legal rules); Eric J. Segall, Justice O'Connor and the Rule of
Law, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 107, 108 (2006) (criticizing, among other things,
O'Connor's "reluctance to articulate principles governing cases").
9. "Kennedy's ruminations produce cases that have outcomes, but no settled
rationale." Douglas W. Kmiec, Overview of the Term: The Rule of Law and Roberts's
Revolution of Restraint, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 495, 497 (2007).
10. For a recent example from the bench, see FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551
U.S. - - 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2679-84 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (criticizing the plurality's rule as overly vague). See generally Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1989)
(suggesting that courts should base their opinions on clear, general pinciples of law rather
than the judges' "personal discretion to do justice").
11. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 209-43 (1999).
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"render decisions that are no broader than necessary to support the
outcome,"'12 thereby reducing the threat of costly mistakes and
refraining from undermining democratic deliberation.
The large literature on standards and rules shows the same
concern with form. While studies have considered a wide variety of
reasons when and why rules might be preferable to standards or vice
versa, they tend to share an assumption that judges' decisions to cast
statements of law one way rather than another are consequential. 3
We have good reason, then, to think that judges vary in how they
approach the crafting of legal principles in their opinions and that the
variation in their approaches is worthy of our attention. But precisely
what differences should we pay attention to? Is it possible to analyze
those differences systematically?
A. One Type of Modesty: Allowing Discretion Versus Imposing
Constraint
Naturally, there are a great many ways one could answer these
questions. To move toward one set of answers, I begin with two more
precise questions: First, given two precedents with differently
formulated legal principles, how might we expect them to differ in
their effects on other actors? Second, what is it about the ways the
principles are formulated that would lead us to predict these different
consequences?
The affected actors I choose to focus on are other judges. The
manifestation of judicial (im)modesty analyzed here is the extent to
which a precedent seems designed to rein in the discretion of other
judges-more precisely, how much a given precedent would be
12. Id. at 11.
13. For helpful overviews, see generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (offering an economic analysis of the
consequences of promulgating legal rules versus legal standards); Duncan Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (dissecting the
choice between rules and standards as the form for legal directives); Russell B. Korobkin,
Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23
(2000) (analyzing the question of legal form from the perspective of law and behavioral
science); and Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term-Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) (setting forth a
comprehensive analysis of the respective arguments for using rules and standards in
Supreme Court decisions). For more skeptical views, see generally Frederick Schauer,
The Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 N.Z. L. REV. 303 (2003) (questioning the
significance of legal form, since actors who apply a court's rule often blur the line between
standards and rules); and Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379
(1985) (arguing that dissecting the difference between standards and rules is fruitless since
it focuses on legal form rather than legal substance).
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expected to constrain the choices of other judges who attempt to
follow it faithfully. A more modest precedent, on this dimension, is
one that permits greater discretion to judges bound by it. For stylistic
variety, I will also sometimes refer to precedents or formulations of
law that should impose significant constraint as "strong."
It is important to note that judges could evince modesty in many
other ways. For instance, they might act modestly by deferring to
existing precedents, following even decisions whose wisdom they
doubt. Or, in setting precedents, they might fetter the interpretations
of other judges while-modestly-permitting more discretion to
those whose behavior is directly regulated by their rulings.
Relatedly, the version of modesty highlighted in this Article is
distinct from the concept of judicial restraint. Deferring to the
decisions of elected officials is typically considered a restraintist
position,14 but an announcement, for example, that courts should
never overturn a statute unless no reasonable person could view it as
constitutional would be highly immodest by the standard employed
here. Similarly, a decision to overrule a precedent that was itself
highly constraining and replace it with one allowing other judges
more room for individual judgment would be activist under some
definitions of the term yet modest by this Article's standard.
Hence, a focus on the imposition of constraint on other judges
will not capture all important aspects of judicial lawmaking. Studying
constraint is nonetheless worthwhile for three important reasons.
First, if precedents truly vary in the amount of constraint they impose
on other judges, then the way a court goes about creating precedent
will have major implications for the distribution of power in a judicial
system. For one thing, it can affect the distribution of power between
higher and lower courts. To the extent the high court in a system
writes in strongly constraining terms, lawmaking should primarily
come from above and tend to be more unified. Conversely, where a
high court sets precedent more modestly, lower courts will enjoy
more power and we would expect to see more diversity in doctrine, at
14. For example, in FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993), the
Court, speaking through Justice Thomas, declared:
[E]qual protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic
of legislative choices. In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory
classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental
constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is
any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the




least at certain stages. Similarly, the constraint imposed by a given
precedent can affect the balance of temporal power. Where the first
court to decide a case announces a clear and easily applicable
statement of law, it has the most say over the direction that the
doctrine will take. On the other hand, in a system where principles
are allowed to emerge over time and retrospectively, more power
resides with the courts that confront an issue later. 5
Second, empirically measuring constraint should also allow us to
speak to major normative debates about the best way to formulate
legal rulings. Claims for the superiority of one type of formulation
over another are especially common in the literature on rules and
standards. 6 As the concept of constraint developed here is related to
the rules/standards distinction, with rules tending to impose more
constraint on judges committed to following them than standards do,
some of those claims will also be relevant for this Article. For
instance, "under a rule it is possible for citizens (with good legal
advice) to know the legal status of their actions with reasonable
certainty ex ante."17  This is true of any highly constraining
formulation, whether or not we call it a rule: where judges have
limited discretion in deciding a type of case, their decisions will be
more predictable, and potential litigants will be surer of what they can
and cannot safely do. To take an argument on the other side,
standards may carry less danger of unjust decisions in specific cases,
as they "allow for the decrease of errors of under- and over-
inclusiveness by giving the decisionmaker more discretion than do
rules."18
Third, judges who follow Sunstein's prescription to decide no
more than necessary will also tend to leave more discretion to other
judges, making it more likely that mistakes in earlier rulings will be
corrected. Leaving the possibility of correction open may be
particularly important given the context in which judicial decisions
occur. As Professors Devins, Meese, and Schauer argue, the
particular case before a judge will often be unrepresentative of the set
of cases in which a given legal issue may arise, and we cannot always
count on a judge to recognize how other cases could differ from the
15. For an excellent theoretical and historical discussion of these different modes of
lawmaking, see generally Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1187 (2007).
16. For a thorough overview of such claims, see Schlag, supra note 13, at 399-426.
17. Korobkin, supra note 13, at 25.
18. Sullivan, supra note 13, at 58-59.
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present one and formulate doctrine accordingly. 9  Insofar as
unrepresentativeness presents a problem that judges have difficulty
overcoming, wisdom would seem to counsel that judges exercise
modesty in the setting of precedents, allow doctrine to develop
gradually as more and more cases are decided, and leave more
ambitious rulemaking to officials with more information and broader
perspectives.
Again, however, there are arguments on the other side. For
instance, strong precedents might produce more legitimate decisions
by leaving less room for future judges' personal values to come into
play in their decisions. Regardless of which argument carries more
force, an empirical consideration of how judges do (or do not) create
constraining precedent will better inform the debate.
B. How Constraint/Discretion Differs from Other Approaches
By this point the phrase "reinventing the wheel" might have
entered the reader's mind. In particular, it would be reasonable to
ask why I am not content to apply the established distinction between
rules and standards.
It is true that the distinction overlaps my distinction between
more or less constraining formulations of legal rulings. Nevertheless,
it seems to me that an effort to work within the rules/standards
tradition is more likely to impede than facilitate progress toward clear
conceptualization and valid, reliable empirical measurement.
One important reason is that scholars have not reached a
consensus on how to define rules and standards. The following few
examples of definitions, while perhaps reconcilable at some level, are
nevertheless markedly different:
[T]he only distinction between rules and standards is the extent
to which efforts to give content to the law are undertaken
before or after individuals act.2"
19. Neal Devins & Alan Meese, Judicial Review and Nongeneralizable Cases, 32 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 323, 325 (2005) (arguing that generating doctrine in cases that do not
present generalizable facts can have serious consequences); Frederick Schauer, Do Cases
Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 890 (2006) (questioning whether it is detrimental
for a general legal rule to arise in the context of a concrete dispute with unique facts).
20. Kaplow, supra note 13, at 560. Sunstein makes a similar distinction:
By the aspiration to a system of rules, I therefore mean to refer to something very
simple: approaches to law that try to make most or nearly all legal judgments
under the governing legal provision in advance of actual cases. We have rules, or
(better) "rule-ness," to the extent that the content of the law has been set down in
advance of applications of the law.
1220 [Vol. 86
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A standard refers directly to one of the substantive objectives
of the legal order.... The application of a standard requires
the judge both to discover the facts of a particular situation and
to assess them in terms of the purposes or social values
embodied in the standard.2'
Rules establish legal boundaries based on the presence or
absence of well-specified triggering facts.... Standards, in
contrast, require adjudicators ... to incorporate into the legal
pronouncement a range of facts that are too broad, too
variable, or too unpredictable to be cobbled into a rule.22
Standards are posited norms that contain vague or controversial
moral or evaluative terms in their formulations. 3
Even more importantly, attempts to fit theoretically rich analyses
of lawmaking into the rules/standards tradition can introduce
cloudiness into otherwise clear accounts without providing any
particular benefits in compensation. Consider, for instance, Sullivan's
discussion of the three-tier approach to judicial review. In her view,
the "recurring distinction in constitutional law between
'categorization' and 'balancing' is a version of the rules/standards
distinction. Categorization corresponds to rules, balancing to
standards., 24 She illustrates this point through an argument that the
development of the two oldest tiers, strict scrutiny and rational basis,
imposed a rule-like quality on decisionmaking in areas where they are
applied, while the more recent subjection of some types of laws to
intermediate scrutiny represents a movement back toward balancing
and standards.2 5
It seems indisputable that intermediate scrutiny is different from
the others; it would appear to require more difficult judgments about
which reasonable people would be more likely to disagree. But is this
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 961 (1994) (emphasis
omitted).
21. Kennedy, supra note 13, at 1688.
22. Korobkin, supra note 13, at 25-26.
23. LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES 29 (2001).
24. Sullivan, supra note 13, at 59.
25. Id. at 60-61. As defined by Justice O'Connor in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), strict scrutiny requires "narrowly tailored measures that further
compelling governmental interests," id. at 227, while under intermediate scrutiny, a law
must be "substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental
objective," id. at 220 (internal quotation marks omitted). The rational basis test requires
only that a law be "rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 966 (1992) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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really because intermediate scrutiny is more standard-like and less
rule-like than the other two levels of scrutiny? It is not easy to see
why we should view the problem this way. The logical forms of all
three tests are identical, each requiring a judgment as to how
important a state interest is and how well tailored the law is to serve
this interest. None of the three is tied more closely to background
principles than the others, uses vaguer language, or calls for different
types of evaluations or attention to a different set of facts. To
preview a point that will be developed more fully later, I would argue
that what separates intermediate scrutiny from the other tests is
simply where it sets the threshold of decision. To pass strict scrutiny,
a law must pass a very high threshold, while it need only pass a very
low threshold under the rational basis test. For most laws, we could
safely predict failure of the former test and passage of the latter. But
intermediate scrutiny, as its name suggests, sets a threshold
somewhere in between, where confident predictions are harder to
make. In short, the difference in formulations that Sullivan points to
is an important one, but it seems best understood as tangential to the
rules/standards distinction.
A second example comes from Ehrlich and Posner.26 The
authors are interested primarily in a legal formulation's specificity or
precision (they use the terms interchangeably). However, they invite
readers to "treat the specificity-generality continuum as if it were a
dichotomy between 'rules' and 'standards,' " with rules distinguished
from standards in this way: "standard" denotes "a general criterion
of social choice," while "[a] rule withdraws from the decisionmaker's
consideration one or more of the circumstances that would be
relevant to decision according to a standard."27 When it comes to
precision, they import the quantitative element of this definition,
maintaining that "the fewer and simpler the facts to which definite
legal consequences attach, the more precise is a legal obligation."2
This move strikes me as a slight, but definite, mistake, as the
following two examples demonstrate.
Federal law and most state laws distinguish between first and
second degree murder in similar ways. This is how the crimes are
defined under federal law:
26. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking,
3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).
27. Id. at 258.
28. Id. at 261.
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Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in
wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and
premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or
attempt to perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping,
treason, espionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual
abuse, child abuse, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated as part
of a pattern or practice of assault or torture against a child or
children; or perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully
and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other
than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree.
Any other murder is murder in the second degree.29
Determining whether a first-degree murder was committed
requires a decisionmaker to consider many more facts than a case of
second-degree murder would. But it is hard to imagine any widely
acceptable definition of either precision or specificity under which the
definition of first-degree murder could be viewed as the less precise
or specific of the two. In fact, I suspect that the vast majority of
English speakers would agree that the definition of first-degree
murder is more precise and specific.
For an example of judge-made law, consider New York Times v.
Sullivan, ° in which the Court held that a public official defamed by a
false statement cannot win damages for libel unless he or she also
proves that "the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not."31  The rule adopted by the Court requires
decisionmakers to take into account more circumstances than would a
simpler rule requiring only proof of a statement's falsity without
regard to the speaker's mental state. But would the actual rule be
considered less precise or specific under any natural use of those
terms? Again, the answer clearly seems to be no.
In these and other instances of thoughtful, sophisticated
theorizing, references to the rules/standards distinction seem to do
little or nothing to enhance the intellectual contributions of the
authors while potentially undermining those contributions or at least
distracting the reader from them. By no means am I suggesting that
the distinction between rules and standards has no value. But I do
believe that in thinking about the character of legal formulations, we
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (2000).
30. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31. Id. at 279-80.
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will typically be better served by worrying less about what a
formulation of law should be called and focusing more on what it is
about the formulation's characteristics and effects that makes it
importantly different from others.
Sunstein does just this in his defense of minimalism,3 2 and there
are obvious similarities between his notion of breadth and the
concept of potential constraint developed here. Nevertheless, there
are important differences. True, a judicial opinion that says no more
than is necessary to decide the present case will normally leave more
freedom to future judges than a broad ruling. But this will not always
be the case. For instance, imagine two possible formulations of law in
search and seizure: (1) X-ray searches of baggage at airports are
constitutional under any circumstances, and (2) a suspicionless search
may be undertaken if interests of public safety substantially outweigh
the individual's interest in privacy. The latter formulation seems
much broader but would likely impose less constraint on judges
willing to be bound by it than would the former.33
My approach most closely tracks Alexander and Sherwin's
discussion of the "determinateness" and "generality" of rules.34 The
more determinate a rule in their usage, the less disagreement there
will be over how to apply it, with a perfectly determinate rule
generating the same answer for anyone attempting to apply it to a
given case.35 A strongly determinate rule that was also highly general,
covering a large set of possible cases, would impose substantial
constraint on judges committed to following it. However, for
purposes of this Article, it is crucial to recognize that a rule can vary
32. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 11.
33. The fact that Sunstein's concepts do not seem to have been developed with
empirical measurement in mind also make them less useful for this Article. Siegel
attempts to render Sunstein's concept of minimalism more useful by providing an
operational definition of it:
[T]o be minimalist according to the operational definition, a decision must have
two components: it must (a) result from the (apparently) intentional choice by a
majority of the Justices (b) to decide a case on the narrowest and shallowest
grounds reasonably open to them, even though broader and deeper rationale(s)
were reasonably available. To say the same thing a slightly different way, a
decision is minimalist if and only if at least five Justices had reasonably available a
broader and deeper result, but consciously (as best one can tell) decided the case
as narrowly and shallowly as reasonably possible.
Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself- Judicial Minimalism at the
Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 1963-64 (2005). But even this definition
does not bring us very close to a workable measurement strategy.
34. ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 23, at 28-32.
35. Id. at 31.
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in its level of determinateness according to the person viewing it. For
instance, the Chevron36 rule that judges should defer to an
administrative agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute should
be highly constraining for judges but not for agency officials.
C. Refining the Definition
So far I have defined the phenomenon to be explored here as the
extent to which a precedent would constrain the decisionmaking of
judges who attempt to apply it faithfully. But this is only a small step
toward an operational definition that would allow for empirical
analysis of the phenomenon. How can we tell how much constraint a
precedent should impose on such judges or whether one should
impose more than another?
As an additional step, we can reframe the concept in numerical
terms by way of a thought experiment. Imagine that one hundred
randomly selected judges (with a surprising amount of time on their
hands) agree to participate in an exercise. We present them with a
precedential case and a large and varied set of hypothetical claims
involving the same issue, very broadly defined, as the precedent-
setting one, e.g., product liability, equal protection, price fixing. We
then ask them to decide each hypothetical claim, applying the
precedent as accurately as possible without regard to their feelings
about the precedent's wisdom. In each case, the judges achieve a
certain level of agreement as to the proper outcome; for instance, in
the first case, ninety-two of the one hundred judges agree that the
plaintiff should prevail, in the second case, seventy-six agree that the
defendant should. By averaging across all cases, we could calculate a
mean agreement rate for applications of a particular precedent. This
mean agreement rate would constitute the numerical measure of a
precedent's strength. An extremely strong, constraint-imposing
precedent would produce a mean agreement rate near one hundred
percent. A very weak precedent would generate an agreement rate
close to fifty percent.
Of course, in actuality we would never be able to calculate a
precedent's strength this way. The utility of this thought experiment
is in making it clearer what we should be asking. Unfortunately,
though, the refinement is only partially successful. To resolve a
contested legal issue, a judge often must answer several discrete
questions. It will not always be obvious how agreement or
disagreement about one particular question will affect agreement
36. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2008] 1225
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
about the ultimate issue. For example, suppose in deciding a tort case
the precedent-setting court laid down a very clear, easily applied test
for the imposition of strict liability. We would expect a large majority
of the judges applying it to reach the same conclusion about whether
a defendant was strictly liable in a given case. But where strict
liability was deemed inapplicable, a court could still rule for the
plaintiff if it found the defendant negligent, and determinations of
negligence might occasion a good deal of disagreement.37
These problems will not arise in many instances, but where they
do, we can overcome them through a slightly more complicated
approach. Instead of case outcomes, we can focus on the discrete
questions-of both law and fact-that judges address in a given case.
Not only may different judges answer the same questions differently,
but if their approaches diverge enough, they may ask different
questions to begin with. Under a perfectly constraining precedent, all
judges will ask the same questions and answer them in the same way.
Under the weakest possible precedent, we might find a hundred
unique patterns of questions and answers among the hundred judges.
Under the revised definition, then, "agreement rate" refers to the
percentage of judges asking and answering the same questions in the
same way in a given case. A stronger, more constraining rule will
produce higher mean levels of such agreement across many cases.
Again, I do not suppose that one could actually measure constraint in
this way. But it should be possible to engage in thought experiments
and roughly estimate the levels of agreement that would be found if
the tests could really be run. Engaging in such thought experiments
should provide considerably more guidance than asking vaguer
questions about a precedent's general character.
Armed with this definition, we can turn to the separate question
of what characteristics of precedents should give them more or less
constraining force. In addition to being interesting in themselves, the
answers might provide an alternative, albeit incomplete, method for
empirically assessing constraint.
37. In fact, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which greater agreement about
strict liability results in less agreement about the ultimate outcome of the case. Suppose
that under Rule A, 100 judges would split evenly on the question of whether the defendant
was strictly liable and that the 50 who decided against strict liability would again divide
evenly on the question of whether the defendant was negligent. The result would be 75
votes for the defendant (50 on the grounds of strict liability, 25 on negligence), 25 for the
plaintiff. Now suppose that under alternative Rule B, there was much wider agreement
about strict liability, with 90 of the judges agreeing that it is not applicable. These 90
judges then split evenly on the question of negligence. The result would be a considerably
more divided vote: 55 for the defendant, 45 for the plaintiff.
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II. CONSTRAINING FORCE OF PRECEDENTS
A. Announcing a Rule
Of all the decisions a precedent-setting court can make to affect
the discretion of later judges, the simplest and most consequential is
whether or not to include in its opinion an explicit statement of the
law justifying the case outcome. A decision not to include such a
statement does not necessarily leave later judges without a compass.
They can apply traditional legal methods to identify the implicit
rationale behind the first court's decision, and there may be some
cases where the rationale is so obvious that an explicit statement
would add nothing to it. In general, however, the inclusion of a
statement of law can be expected to produce more constraint.38 As
Peter Tiersma notes:
When a holding is set forth in such a textual form, it becomes
much harder for a court lower in the hierarchy to avoid it by
ignoring it or distinguishing it in some way. In fact, an appellate
court itself will find it difficult to tactfully avoid mentioning an
embarrassing precedent.39
By the same token, an explicit statement of law will provide more
useful guidance to a court that desires to follow precedent faithfully.4"
Normally, therefore, a precedent that sets out an explicit legal
rule4 will be more constraining than one that does not. However, the
38. One can imagine circumstances when judges feel less constrained following the
announcement of a new rule because the new rule brings uncertainty into an area where
the law had been settled and well understood. But in such circumstances it is probably not
the announcement itself that creates the uncertainty but the departure from existing
doctrine. Imagine that a court, while reaching a result that cannot be reconciled with
existing doctrine, fails to offer a new legal basis for its decision. We would typically expect
other judges faced with such a decision to experience at least as much, if not more,
uncertainty as they would if the court explained its departure with a new rule.
39. Tiersma, supra note 15, at 1256. Tiersma refers here to the explicit statement of
holdings, just one of several modern American practices that he defines as constituting
"textualization." Id. at 1188. Others include changes in official reporting to emphasize
the written opinion of a judge to the exclusion of almost anything else (such as exchanges
in oral argument) and the replacement of seriatim opinions with opinions for the court.
Id. at 1229-33.
40. Richard Fallon and Mitchell Berman distinguish abstract statements of what the
Constitution means or requires from statements of law that read more as instructions to
lower courts for how to decide a constitutional question. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 37-41 (2001); Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional
Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (2004). Although this distinction strikes me as both
valid and valuable, I do not attempt to apply it in this Article, instead counting any
statement of law that could provide guidance to other judges, no matter how abstract.
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amount of constraint the statement imposes will depend on the
character of the statement.
Most obviously, a court can impose more or less constraint on
other judges by forbidding or allowing them to do something. In Rita
v. United States,42 the Supreme Court did both. It had previously
ruled, in United States v. Booker,43 that the federal sentencing
guidelines were not mandatory and that circuit courts should review
the sentencing decisions of district judges under a "reasonableness"
standard. In Rita, the Court held: (a) it is constitutional for a court of
appeals to presume that a sentence falling within the guidelines is
reasonable;' but (b) the sentencing judge, as opposed to appeals
court, may not begin with a presumption that a sentence within the
guidelines is reasonable. 5
A bit more subtly, a court can make a rule less constraining than
it otherwise would be by including language that turns it into more of
a suggestion than a command. For instance, in Riggins v. Nevada,46
the Court held as follows: "Under Harper, forcing antipsychotic
drugs on a convicted prisoner is impermissible absent a finding of
overriding justification and a determination of medical
appropriateness. The Fourteenth Amendment affords at least as
much protection to persons the State detains for trial. '47 The Court
was similarly noncommittal in the First Amendment case of Rankin v.
McPherson":
[I]n weighing the State's interest in discharging an employee
based on any claim that the content of a statement made by the
employee somehow undermines the mission of the public
employer, some attention must be paid to the responsibilities of
the employee within the agency. The burden of caution
employees bear with respect to the words they speak will vary
41. To avoid awkwardness, from this point I will use the term "rule" interchangeably
with "statement of law" and "legal formulation." I employ the term broadly, not, as in the
rules/standards debate, to denote a particular kind of formulation. A rule here can be
broad or narrow, highly constraining or not.
42. 551 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
43. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
44. Rita, 551 U.S. at , 127 S. Ct. at 2462.
45. Id. at - 127 S. Ct. at 2465.
46. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
47. Id. at 135 (emphasis added) (referencing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210
(1990)).
48. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
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with the extent of authority and public accountability the
employee's role entails.49
B. Characteristics of Rules
Turning to more specific characteristics of legal statements, it is
probably impossible to catalogue all of those that can affect the level
of constraint imposed. However, we can hope to identify some of the
most important by focusing on two general traits: how directly a
rule's legal conclusion follows from its factual premise(s) and how
easy it is to determine the soundness of the factual premise(s).
To begin, consider the following examples of legal formulations
contained in following cases:
Roper v. Simmons"°: The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were
under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.51
Printz v. United States"2 : We held in New York that Congress
cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal
regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot
circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State's officers
directly. The Federal Government may neither issue directives
requiring the States to address particular problems, nor
command the States' officers, or those of their political
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and
no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is
necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible
with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.53
United States v. Dunn4: [W]e believe that curtilage questions
should be resolved with particular reference to four factors: the
proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home,
whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding
the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and
the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from
observation by people passing by.... We do not suggest that
combining these factors produces a finely tuned formula that,
when mechanically applied, yields a "correct" answer to all
49. Id. at 390 (emphases added).
50. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
51. Id. at 578.
52. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
53. Id. at 935 (referring to New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1991)).
54. 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
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extent-of-curtilage questions. Rather, these factors are useful
analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they
bear upon the centrally relevant consideration-whether the
area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it
should be placed under the home's "umbrella" of Fourth
Amendment protection.55
One characteristic, evident in the first two rules, is what we might
call absoluteness or definitiveness. A legal principle can usefully be
viewed as having an "if p, then q" structure, where p denotes an
initial determination required of a judge and q denotes the legal
conclusion that should follow.56 The Roper and Printz rules appear
strong because they call for no complicated analyses and allow for no
doubt whether q should follow from p. This is not true for all
statements of law. Some take a form that could be expressed as "if p,
then probably q." For example, in People v. Brendlin,57 the California
Supreme Court held that a passenger in a vehicle stopped by the
police is not necessarily seized for Fourth Amendment purposes;
there is no constitutional seizure "in the absence of additional
circumstances that would indicate to a reasonable person that he or
she was the subject of the peace officer's investigation or show of
authority." 58
We also see this attenuation of the link between premise and
conclusion in rules that create presumptions. One example is the
Court's test for equal protection violations in the use of peremptory
challenges. Under Batson v. Kentucky59 and later cases extending it,
once the objecting party makes a prima facie case of race- or gender-
based discrimination, the burden of proof shifts to the other party to
come forward with a neutral explanation of its pattern of challenges.6"
55. Id. at 301.
56. This point has been made by numerous scholars. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER,
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 47-52 (1991); Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 26,
at 259; Kennedy, supra note 13, at 1689-90; Schlag, supra note 13, at 383-90.
57. 136 P.3d 845 (Cal. 2006).
58. Id. at 846. By reversing the California Supreme Court and rejecting this approach
in favor of a definitive rule that the passenger is automatically seized, the U.S. Supreme
Court announced a rule, like those in Printz and Roper, that falls far to the side of
constraining side of the constraint/discretion dimension. See Brendlin v. California, 551
U.S. - - 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2403 (2007) ("When a police officer makes a traffic stop, the
driver of the car is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.... We hold that
a passenger is seized as well and so may challenge the constitutionality of the stop.").
59. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
60. Id. at 97; J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 144-45 (1994) ("As with race-
based Batson claims, a party alleging gender discrimination must make a prima facie
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Similarly, under Arizona v. Fulminante,6' when confronted with a
constitutional violation in a criminal trial, the reviewing court asks
whether the violation was a "structural" error, affecting "[t]he entire
conduct of the trial from beginning to end,, 62 or a "trial" error "which
occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which
may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other
evidence presented., 63 If the violation is a structural error, only one
result can follow-the conviction must be reversed. However, if it is a
trial error, the reviewing court must take an additional step, asking
whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. If so, the
conviction stands; if not, it must be reversed.6'
More definitive rules, then, will normally be stronger than ones
that call for additional judgments after p has been established. But
this does not mean all definitive rules will be equally strong. While
the rules in Roper and Printz appear equally absolute, most observers
would probably agree that the rules in the first case imposes
somewhat more constraint than the rule in the second. This is
because the conclusion in Roper is triggered by a simple finding of
fact-that the offender committed the crime as a minor.65  By
contrast, under Printz a judge must first determine whether Congress
has indeed attempted to "compel the States to enact or enforce a
",66federal regulatory program, a judgment that will sometimes, but
not always, be obvious. Broadly, while the two cases are alike in that
the legal conclusion q follows automatically, or nearly automatically,
from recognition of premise p, they differ in the extent to which the
judgment whether the premise holds is open to serious disagreement.
The distinction may be clearer if we include Dunn, the curtilage
case, in the comparison. The Court's test for identifying curtilage is
obviously a far weaker formulation than those in Roper or Printz.
The reason is partly that q does not follow immediately from p in
curtilage cases: a search of the grounds outside the curtilage falls
outside the protections of the Fourth Amendment, but a search
within the curtilage is not necessarily unconstitutional. 67  But even
more important is that adjudging whether p holds (the search
showing of intentional discrimination before the party exercising the challenge is required
to explain the basis for the strike.").
61. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
62. Id. at 309.
63. Id. at 307-08.
64. Id. at 295-96.
65. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,568 (2005).
66. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
67. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1987).
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occurred within the curtilage) is a complex task. Why, exactly?
Perhaps the main reason is that it calls for a judge to take into
account multiple considerations in making that determination. Now,
multiple considerations need not always entail a weaker rule. For
instance, imagine the Court were to limit the Roper rule so that the
death penalty could be applied to someone who was convicted of
committing more than one murder as a minor. The new rule would
allow no more discretion than the existing one. But where, as in
Dunn, considerations leave room for disagreement, requiring more of
them will normally result in greater discretion.68
Accordingly, to rein in lower courts' discretion, the Supreme
Court will sometimes rule expressly that a particular consideration
may not be taken into account in judges' reasoning. We see this, for
example, in Colorado v. Spring69: "[W]e hold that a suspect's
awareness of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of
interrogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment
privilege."70
Even where the assessment of p requires only a single judgment,
some formulations will be more constraining than others. As with the
Roper and Printz rules, the difference will sometimes lie in how
precise or narrow a determination is called for. The Roper rule seems
stronger than the rule announced in Printz, but both are clearly more
constraining than the rule announced in Greene v. Lindsey71 :
"[W]here an inexpensive and efficient mechanism such as mail service
is available to enhance the reliability of an otherwise unreliable notice
procedure, the State's continued exclusive reliance on an ineffective
means of service" violates the Due Process Clause.72 Reasonable
people are more likely to disagree about whether a mechanism is
inexpensive and efficient than whether Congress has attempted to
compel state enforcement of a federal program.
Unfortunately, the concept of precision is difficult to define or
apply systematically. The concept does not lend itself to absolute
68. One could reasonably view multiple-considerations formulations as substantially
similar to the exceptions and presumptions formulations discussed earlier. But conceptual
clarity is aided by the effort to refine categories, and I think it is useful to distinguish
between cases that require multiple steps from antecedent to consequent (exceptions and
presumptions cases) and those requiring complicated assessments to determine a single
antecedent.
69. 479 U.S. 564 (1987).
70. Id. at 577.
71. 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
72. Id. at 455.
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judgments; we will often be uncomfortable labeling a rule "precise"
or "imprecise" and will frequently have trouble telling which of two
rules is more precise. Nevertheless, where disparities between
formulations are large, we can confidently adjudge one formulation
more constraining than another.
Much the same can be said about a distinction between
formulations calling for subjective evaluations and those calling for
determinations of fact. As a general rule, the former allow more
discretion than the latter. And the distinction will sometimes be easy
to make. Applying strict scrutiny requires one to make a subjective
evaluation: Is the governmental interest at issue compelling?
Applying the Roper and Printz rules does not. But other cases will be
more difficult to categorize. For instance, where, as in Greene above,
a judge is asked to decide whether a mechanism is "inexpensive and
efficient," is the judge being asked to make a subjective or objective
evaluation? A plausible argument could be made on either side.
Where a formulation does not call for a judgment that is highly
precise and objective, a third characteristic can be important for
determining how much constraint the rule will impose. Many
decisions can be thought of as requiring a judge to decide whether a
certain threshold has been crossed. Consider again the question
whether a mechanism is "inexpensive and efficient."
Inexpensiveness, like efficiency, is not a discrete trait that is simply
possessed or not. To judge whether something is inexpensive, one
asks whether the cost is low enough-that is, whether it falls below a
certain threshold. Often the threshold will not be perfectly defined,
and in such instances it will be more difficult to categorize an item
that falls near the threshold. (A $50,000 car is not inexpensive, a
$3,000 car is. What about a $15,000 car? That is harder to say.) Even
if one judge has a very well defined threshold (e.g., all and only cars
priced under $13,000 are inexpensive), other judges may set the
threshold at a different spot, resulting, again, in more disagreement
over items that fall near the threshold. Consequently, if a threshold is
set at a point near which many cases would be expected to fall, we
would expect it to generate more disagreement than a threshold set
farther away.
To repeat a claim made earlier, both the strict scrutiny and
rational basis tests should produce more consensus across a broad set
of cases than intermediate scrutiny. We would not expect a high
proportion of statutes passed by a legislature to fall near either the
rational basis or strict scrutiny side of the spectrum; most laws are
clearly rationally related to a legitimate interest and just as clearly not
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narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. On the other hand,
many laws will fall close to the "substantially related to an important
interest" threshold,73 generating more disagreement about which side
of the threshold they fall on. For another example, imagine restating
the Greene rule from above as follows: Where a very inexpensive and
extremely efficient mechanism is available to enhance the reliability of
an otherwise manifestly unreliable notice procedure, the State's
continued exclusive reliance on an ineffective means of service
violates the Due Process Clause. The addition of strict qualifiers to
the key adjectives would shift the thresholds in directions that should
make people less likely to disagree about the average case, resulting
in a stronger, more constraining rule.
C. Generality and Context
So far I have argued that the amount of constraint imposed by a
legal formulation will depend in part on how assuredly a conclusion
(q) follows from a premise (p) and in part on how much room there is
to disagree about whether the premise is correct. Levels of
disagreement about whether p holds will be affected by: the number
of separate judgments required to assess p, how precise the decision
rule is, how objective or subjective the determination is, and where
the threshold between p and not-p occurs.
It may seem like an obvious and important characteristic has
been overlooked. Kennedy74 and Alexander and Sherwin75 both
point to "generality" as an important component of a legal statement
and are clearly right to do so. Consider Tull v. United States, 76 where
the Court was called upon to decide whether the Seventh
Amendment gave a defendant the right to have its penalty for
violating the Clean Water Act determined by a jury.77 The Court
could have contented itself with deciding that there was no right to a
jury determination of penalties imposed under the Clean Water Act.
However, the Court opted for a broader rule: "[A] determination of
a civil penalty is not an essential function of a jury trial, and ... the
Seventh Amendment does not require a jury trial for that purpose in
a civil action., 78 It seems fair to label such a rule, clearly going
73. These tests are probably better viewed as involving two thresholds, but that is not
important for this example.
74. Kennedy, supra note 13, at 1689-90.
75. ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 23, at 28-32.
76. 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
77. Id. at 414.
78. Id. at 427.
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beyond what is strictly necessary to decide the case, as strong or even
immodest.
As important as generality would seem to be, however, it does
not turn out to have much direct application to the task of this
Article.79 This is largely because the constraining effects of generality
are straightforward only when a court writes on a blank slate, which
courts today rarely do. When a new rule modifies existing doctrine,
the relationship between generality and constraint depends crucially
on the character of the doctrine being modified. Suppose that the
Court were to reconsider Tull this Term and decide that it was too
absolute, ruling instead that there is a right to a jury where the
conduct occasioning the penalty could have justified a prosecution
under criminal law. If the scope of this new rule were precisely the
same as in Tull, covering all civil actions, it would introduce
discretionary judgment in all those cases where Tull allowed none.
But if the new rule applied to only a single statute or class of statutes,
this less general version of the new rule would leave more constraint
in place.
In fact, the effects of generality are not always straightforward
even when a court is addressing an issue for the first time. In the
short term, a more general rule will always impose more constraint
than a less general one, because it will leave fewer areas of complete
discretion. But the announcement of a broad rule at the first stage
may forestall the development of different rules for specific subsets of
issues. Where these rules would have been more definitive, precise,
or otherwise more constraining than the general rule, the long-term
effect will be to leave other judges less constrained than they
otherwise would have been.
It turns out, then, that the key question for an analysis of
constraint is not how general a rule is but whether it expands or
reduces the set of cases in which disagreement is likely to occur. One
important and recurring type of case where the Court does one or the
other involves the question of how broadly to interpret the scope of a
constitutional right. Compare Plyler v. Doe,8" in which the Court
79. Paul Mahoney and Chris Sanchirico provide another reason to think that
generality is important, demonstrating that under certain conditions, rules directed at
specific activities will be more likely to privilege the interests of regulated actors over
those of society generally than would rules governing a range of activities. Paul G.
Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico, General and Specific Legal Rules, 161 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 329, 344-45 (2005). However, their analysis
depends only on generality per se and not on the extent to which general rules are more
constraining, as defined here.
80. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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ruled that the Equal Protection Clause applies to illegal aliens,8 with
United States v. Place,82 where the Court ruled that allowing drug dogs
to sniff a person's luggage does not constitute a search under the
Fourth Amendment.83 The former ruling expands the discretion of
other judges by adding more cases to the set in which a violation
might be found; the latter reduces discretion by eliminating cases
from the set.
An even more direct way to impose constraint by reducing the
set of controversial cases is to declare some types of cases off limits to
the courts. Think of Supreme Court decisions in the last two decades
denying parties standing, especially in environmental' and
Establishment Clause85 cases, or finding suits against states barred by
the Eleventh Amendment.86 Each decision of this sort imposes
constraint by defining a set of cases where judges have no decision to
make at all and hence cannot disagree with each other on the merits.
To label such a ruling strong or immodest might seem odd. A
devotee of Bickel87 or Justice Frankfurter88 would applaud it as an
example of necessary and salutary restraint. One response is to recall
that a decision can be modest in more than one way, and this Article
is concerned with only one. But there is also an argument to be made
that rulings that at first glance seem modest under other definitions
may in fact not be. Note, for instance, that given the usual
perspectives of plaintiffs in Establishment Clause and environmental
cases, denials of standing will typically ensure that conservative
81. Id. at 230.
82. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
83. Id. at 706-07.
84. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (denying
standing based on a lack of injury and redressability).
85. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S ..... 127 S. Ct.
2553, 2563 (2007) (rejecting claim of standing because interest asserted was "too
generalized and attenuated").
86. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine 527 U.S. 706, 760 (1999) (holding that the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 does not abrogate a state's sovereign immunity); Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75-76 (1996) (holding that Congress did not have authority
under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate states' sovereign immunity).
87. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (defending the legitimacy of judicial
review but arguing that judges should often refrain from exercising it through the "passive
virtues" of issue avoidance).
88. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(cautioning that "[d]isregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the Court's
'judicial Power' not only presages the futility of judicial intervention in the essentially
political conflict of forces" involved in apportionment disputes, but also "may well impair
the Court's position as the ultimate organ of 'the supreme Law of the Land' ").
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policies prevail. Denying access to courts for positions a judge
disagrees with is a highly effective way of shaping policy in the judge's
desired direction and in this sense can be seen as a significant exertion
of power.
III. EMPIRICAL DATA
To this point I have set out an operational definition of the
extent to which a precedent imposes constraint on later judges and
identified a set of characteristics tending to make precedents stronger
or weaker in this sense. Although neither the definition nor the list is
complete, they should offer sufficient guidance to allow for some
preliminary empirical explorations of how individual Justices and the
Court as a whole go about setting precedents. The questions I hope
to address are whether the Supreme Court as an institution shows any
clear tendencies toward more or less modest precedents and whether
there are interesting similarities or differences across Courts and
Justices. More specifically, is there evidence that the behavior of the
Roberts Court is likely to diverge much from that of earlier Courts?
As suggested earlier, how much constraint to impose through a
precedent can be viewed as involving two decisions: whether to
include an explicit statement of law in the court's opinion and, if a
statement is to be included, how to formulate it. There may be rare
cases where the logic or principle underlying a decision is so obvious
that the decision can guide other judges even where the law is not
expressly stated. But most often the decision not to include a
statement of law will allow for more disagreement among judges in
future cases. On the other hand, the inclusion of an explicit rule will
not always result in significant constraint. That depends on the
characteristics of the rule. Accordingly, I ask the following questions
about each case: Does the Court set out an explicit statement of law?
If so, how constraining is the statement?
A. Coding Rules
Ascertaining the presence or absence of an explicit rule requires
attentive reading of cases but is otherwise a fairly straightforward task
in most instances. A court will often signal that a statement of law is
to come with a phrase such as "We hold" or "In our view." Whether
or not they are so prefaced, rules typically appear near the beginnings
or ends of delineated sections of an opinion. The syllabus of the case
can also be helpful in identifying statements of law.
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In my coding of cases, two judgments presented the most
frequent problems. First, I counted a holding as a rule only if it was
framed broadly enough to be understood as intended to govern a
non-trivial number of cases. For example, the Court's holding that
"application of the Unruh Act to California Rotary Clubs does not
violate the right of expressive association afforded by the First
Amendment" is not counted as a rule.89 A close reading might
uncover logic applicable to other statutes or organizations, but the
Court chose to state the law in a way that did not explicitly apply to
them. It is difficult to offer a more precise coding rule, so the reader
should bear in mind that some narrow holdings that might qualify as
rules in some people's eyes are not treated as rules here. Under the
same principle, I did not ask whether a legal statement should be
considered a holding or dicta. If the Court announced a rule, I coded
it as one, regardless of whether the rule was necessary to the decision
of the case.
The second sometimes problematic judgment was whether a rule
was new. Because this is an Article about the setting of precedents,
not the treatment of existing ones, it would not make sense to count
simple citations of established rules. However, an extension or
limitation of an existing rule could affect levels of constraint, as could
an attempt to restate a rule in new terms. For this reason, I coded
any alteration of a rule as a new one. A case was coded as making an
explicit statement of law only where these guidelines allowed for a
confident determination. In cases of doubt, the coding decision was
"no rule."
Ideally, having identified a rule I would be able to assess its
strength in absolute terms so as to be able to compare it with rules
from other cases. But it would be very difficult to make such an
assessment even qualitatively and using few categories (e.g., very
strong, fairly strong, fairly weak, etc.). For one thing, a single rule can
possess several characteristics that operate in opposing ways, some
enhancing discretion, others reducing it. Furthermore, appearances
can be deceiving, and rules will not always operate in practice as we
would expect them to. Sometimes what appears to be an open-ended
rule will turn out to allow few real options to judges in actual cases,
while a rule that seems strong and clear will prove confusing in
practice.90
89. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l. v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987).
90. For a fuller discussion of this problem, see Kaplow, supra note 13, at 588-93. See
also Schlag, supra note 13, at 406-12 (arguing that the degree of certainty afforded by
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Because I coded the results without assistance, assessing absolute
levels of constraint was not feasible.9' Therefore, I chose instead to
code the rule in each case relative to an alternative. Specifically, I
asked whether the Court's ruling in a case appeared to impose more,
less, or about the same amount of constraint as the rule proposed by
the party whose position on the relevant issue was rejected by the
Court. In many cases, the Court describes the alternative in a
summary of the parties' arguments. Where it omits this summary but
reverses the lower court, the alternative can usually be found in its
summary of the lower court's reasoning. In the small minority of
cases where the alternative is not clearly spelled out in one place or
the other, it is often a fairly simple matter to infer the alternative
from the Court's discussion.
To judge the relative effect of the rule, I drew on both the
operational definition and list of characteristics described above.
That is, I began by identifying key characteristics and noting their
implications: e.g., the Court's rule is more objective than the
alternative (more constraining); the Court's rule would require judges
to make an additional judgment (less constraining). But the ultimate
coding question was whether the Court's rule would be expected to
produce higher rates of agreement among the hypothetical sample of
judges (more constraining), lower rates (less constraining), or similar
rates (neutral).
Probably the most common reason for coding a rule as neutral-
occurring in ten cases-was that it constituted an answer to a simple
yes-or-no question. For example, in Rodriguez v. Popular
Democratic Party,92 the Court announced that a state or territory
may, consistent with the Constitution, allow a legislative vacancy to
be filled by a vote of the vacating representative's political party.93
Had the Court ruled the opposite way, the resulting rule would have
been no more or less constraining on other judges. In the interest of
drawing cautious conclusions from the data, I also coded as neutral
any rule that I could not confidently assess.
Some cases produced more than one rule. Rather than count a
single case more than once, I took into account all rules in assessing
the precedent's overall strength. Where the rules tended in the same
rules necessarily depends on how a court characterizes the context in which it is to be
applied).
91. Reliably coding absolute levels of constraint, if possible at all, would require
multiple coders and tests of intercoder agreement.
92. 457 U.S. 1 (1982).
93. Id. at 12.
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direction, of course, the coding decision was simple. Where one was
constraining and one discretion-enhancing, I attempted to discern
which rule would likely be relevant to a greater number of future
decisions. Where this was easy to discern, I coded the precedent
according to the direction of the more significant rule. In the five
cases where it was not, I coded the precedent as neutral.
While this approach does have the benefit of being more reliable
than attempts to code constraint in absolute terms, it carries
significant costs in terms of validity. Most importantly, we would
rarely expect judges' choices between competing positions to be
driven primarily by considerations of constraint and discretion.
Rather, we would expect them to choose the positions that strike
them as sounder on the merits. So the choice of a more constraining
rule might not reflect a judge's views on constraint. That said, a judge
wishing to proceed modestly, leaving more discretion to other judges,
always has the option not to include an explicit statement of a new
legal rule. Another concern is that the stronger of two possible rules
in one case might be much weaker than the stronger rule in another.
Accordingly, we should be somewhat cautious in making comparisons
across cases and, therefore, comparisons across Courts and Justices.
That is, if we find that one Justice writes relatively constraining rules
more often than another, we can view that finding as evidence that
the first Justice is a greater proponent of strong rules but should be
aware that the evidence is far from conclusive.
B. The Cases
Although the coding scheme laid out here could be applied to
any type of case, I have elected to restrict this analysis to cases where
the primary issue involves the U.S. Constitution.94 The chief reason is
that, in my experience, statutory cases more often present the
Supreme Court with precise questions that do not leave as much
room for choices about whether and how to set out explicit rules.
Other types of cases allow for more variation but are not as common
before the Court and would make comparisons across time and
Justices more difficult.
94. Constitutional cases were identified using the issue variable from Harold Spaeth's
United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953-2006 Terms, http://www.as.uky.edu/
polisci/ulmerproject/sctdata.htm. My thanks to Stefanie Lindquist for providing a do-file
to define these cases in STATA.
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My sampling strategy was to start with the October 2006 Term
("OT 2006") 95 and work backwards in five-year steps, coding every
constitutional case resulting in a written opinion on the merits,
whether signed or per curiam. To make sure of including some data
from the Warren Court, I coded the 1966 Term. Finally, because the
Court's docket has shrunk in recent years and I wanted sufficient data
on all of the Justices who have served in the past few years, I
supplemented the sample by adding the first Term of the Roberts
Court and the last two Terms of the Rehnquist Court. Thus, the
dataset comprises all constitutional decisions from the following
Terms: 1966, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006.
There are 330 cases in all.
Table 1. Percentage of Cases Containing an Explicit New Statement
of Law.













95. "OT [year]" refers to the Term of the Supreme Court beginning in October of the
year noted.
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Table 2: Level of Constraint Imposed by Statement of Law, Relative
to Rejected Alternative.
Term Less More Total
Constraint (%) Same (%) Constraint (%)
1966 28.6 14.3 57.1 21
1981 35.9 15.4 48.7 39
1986 10.7 35.7 53.6 28
1991 66.7 8.3 25.0 24
1996 42.9 7.1 50.0 14
2001 30.0 30.0 40.0 10
2003 22.2 0 77.8 9
2004 30.8 7.7 61.5 13
2005 42.9 7.1 50.0 14
2006 0 30.0 70.0 10
Total 34.1 15.9 50.0 182
I begin with a broad overview of the Court's lawmaking behavior
before turning to variation across time and across Justices. According
to my coding, the Court explicitly set out a new statement of law in
182 (55.2%) of these cases. While I did not begin this study with clear
expectations, this strikes me as a surprisingly low figure. When a
court refrains from laying down a legal rule in the course of an
opinion, it almost always leaves more discretion to other judges than
it otherwise would. The Supreme Court defines federal constitutional
law for every other court in the country, and, as the Justices have
been known to remark, views its chief function as lawmaking, not
error correction.96 For that Court to refrain from announcing a rule
in nearly half its cases is, in my view, a fairly striking display of
judicial modesty.
Conservative coding rules may be partially responsible for this
finding. Recall that I only counted statements of law that clearly
included something the Court had not previously said. One could
argue that even in cases where the Court only cites an existing rule it
96. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616-17 (1974) ("This Court's review ... is
discretionary and depends on numerous factors other than the perceived correctness of
the judgment we are asked to review.").
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can still provide guidance to lower courts by demonstrating how the
rule should be applied. This is surely correct, but the fact remains
that the Court could provide even more guidance by coupling its
example with a new statement of the rule to help clarify it. Moreover,
a count of rules announced does not tell the whole story. What did
the Court do in those rules? By my coding, in only half (ninety-one)
of the cases where the Court chose to lay out a rule did it choose the
more constraining alternative. In over a third of the cases (sixty-two),
the rule it announced imposed less constraint on other judges than
the rule it rejected would have. In all, the Court was presented with
330 opportunities to issue strongly constraining legal rules. It did so
in just over a quarter of these cases.
Is there important variation over time or across Justices? Tables
1 and 2 display results by Term. Someone looking hard for patterns
in the percentages might detect a slight tendency for earlier Courts in
the sample to announce rules more readily, and perhaps if the data
were extended to include more cases from the Burger and, especially,
Warren Courts, a sharper pattern would emerge.97 But the disparities
shown here are not particularly large or systematic. They look
smaller still when we turn to levels of constraint. Note that while the
Court in earlier Terms was slightly more likely to issue rules, those
rules were slightly less likely to be more constraining than the
rejected alternatives. Comparing the percentage of all cases that
resulted in highly constraining statements of law, we are left with no
basis to conclude that recent Courts have been more modest. For
instance, the rates were thirty percent in OT 1981 and only seventeen
percent in OT 1991 versus twenty-nine percent in OT 2005 and thirty-
two percent in OT 2006.98
It is important to emphasize here that this Article is concerned
with only one way in which the Court might impose constraint on
other judges. Other strategies are also available. For instance, it
could attempt to rein them in by exercising more discretion and
taking more cases. (Viewed this way, the 1981 Term Court stands
out.) Or it could take and decide cases in particular patterns, in an
97. We would be even more likely to find a pattern if we surveyed the entire history
of the Court. See Tiersma, supra note 15, at 1248-55 (showing that the Court was much
less inclined in its early years than it is now to state legal rules boldly, using such terms as
"We hold").
98. I do not present measures of statistical significance for these differences because
they would offer a false sense of precision. The measures employed here are at a
preliminary stage of development, and general patterns should be given more weight than
specific numbers.
2008] 1243
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
effort to guide lower courts through example even without
reformulating doctrine. The data in this study illustrate how the
Court responds to opportunities to use one particular method.
Table 3. Frequency and Relative Constraint of Rules, Selected
Justices.
% of % of % of All
Justice % Explicit Statements Statements Decisions Total
Statements High- Low- High- Decisions
Constraint Constraint Constraint
Rehnquist 63.2 70.8 29.2 44.7 38
O'Connor 42.9 22.2 55.6 9.5 21
Stevens 60.6 40.0 35.0 24.2 33
Scalia 69.0 55.0 30.0 37.9 29
Kennedy 58.8 50.0 50.0 29.4 17
Souter 42.9 33.3 66.7 14.3 14
Thomas 44.4 50.0 25.0 22.2 9
Ginsburg 66.7 33.3 16.7 22.2 9
Breyer 53.9 28.6 42.9 15.4 13
Blackmun 60.0 55.6 11.1 33.3 15
White 54.2 23.1 50.0 12.5 24
Note: High-Constraint means the Court's rule is more constraining
than rejected alternative; Low-Constraint means the opposite.
Interesting variation across Justices is immediately apparent in
Table 3, which displays results for opinions of the Court99 written by
the last eleven Justices to sit on the Court before Roberts joined it.
99. It is possible that Justices are constrained in their writing by the types of cases
they are assigned or the voting coalitions in those cases. A study of separate opinions
might give us more purchase on individual Justices' tendencies. But someone wishing to
undertake such a study would have to think hard about the proper baseline for
comparison across Justices since, compared to the opinion of the court, there is less
expectation that judges will provide guiding statements of law in dissents and no such
expectations for concurrences, which can be written for a whole host of reasons.
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One striking finding is that the scores for Justices Scalia and
O'Connor are strongly consistent with their reputations. Scalia
announces an explicit rule in the highest percentage of cases;
O'Connor is tied (with Justice Souter) for the lowest percentage. Of
course, O'Connor might have used her few rules to impose serious
constraint on other judges, while Scalia's rules might tend to leave
them with more discretion. Taking into account relative constraint
does change the picture, but only slightly. Looking in the fourth
column of the Table, we see that O'Connor still comes out as the
most modest Justice, announcing a rule more constraining than the
rejected alternative in only nine percent of her cases (two of twenty-
one). Scalia is no longer the most immodest Justice by this measure,
losing his spot to Justice Rehnquist, who announced slightly fewer
rules but was a bit more likely to make his rules constraining. Justice
Blackmun comes in a fairly close third, with numbers that look much
like Scalia's. Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg, who is just behind Scalia
in rulemaking rate, slips back to the middle of the pack under the
final measure, as only a small proportion of the rules she announces
are relatively highly constraining. Of course, the reader should note
that her scores are based on only nine cases and so should be
regarded with caution.
We also have too few cases from Justice Alito or Chief Justice
Roberts to make confident evaluations, but it is worth noting that
Roberts has begun his tenure showing a preference for strong
precedents, announcing rules in five of seven cases and choosing the
more constraining alternative in four of those five.' °
A larger number of cases across the board would allow for more
definitive conclusions, but I think these results lend support to our
intuitions that there are real differences across Justices and that, say,
a Court made up of Scalias would make constitutional law quite
differently from one made up of O'Connors. On the other hand, the
evidence does not give us much reason to suppose that Roberts Court
lawmaking will depart in a dramatic way from past practice in this
respect, in part because it is far from clear that Roberts will refrain
from imposing constraint on other judges, and in part because the
Justice replaced by Alito was one of the most modest in this regard.
If forced to bet, then, I would wager that the Roberts Court will not
make constitutional law in an unusually modest fashion. That said,
this Court is only two years old, and the empirical methods employed
100. Alito has only two cases in this dataset. He announced a relatively constraining
rule in one, and no rule in the other.
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here are not sufficiently sound to support strong conclusions. If a
study employing more fully developed measures were to be
conducted several years from now, it might well yield different
conclusions.
CONCLUSION
As is probably evident from this Article, developing a solid
measure of a precedent's potential to impose constraint on other
judges is a daunting task. Clear conceptualization is a necessary first
step, and I hope this Article will be viewed as having taken that step.
It has also demonstrated, I believe, that the difficulties involved in
coding potential constraint are not intractable. Nevertheless, those
decisions entail enough judgment to call the reliability of the measure
into question. That is, we cannot be confident that different
observers would code different cases the same way.
In a world where scores of judges had the time and inclination to
decide scores of hypothetical cases, there would be no problem; we
would simply calculate agreement rates and have our measure. In the
world we actually live in, the best solution is probably to have
multiple expert coders each estimate a judicial agreement rate for a
given rule. Judges or lawyers would be ideal coders, but third- or
even second-year law students would likely have sufficient training.
Provided we found reasonable rates of agreement across coders,
averaging their estimates would take us some way toward the ideal of
testing a rule on many judges in many cases.
It is possible that this estimation task is simply too difficult, and
we would wind up with wildly varying estimates. Perhaps there are
too many subtle qualities that vary across rules for different observers
to agree about their ability to constrain. In that case, another option
would be to leave aside the more global question and focus instead on
the rule characteristics analyzed in this Article, refining definitions of
them where necessary, and having a panel of expert judges code for
each characteristic separately. One could then compute a measure of
constraint based on the ratio of constraint-promoting characteristics
to discretion-promoting characteristics. Alternatively, one could give
up on a general measure of constraint altogether and engage only in
comparisons of discrete characteristics: for example, does a court's
willingness to allow exceptions to its rules vary over time, or is one




To the extent we are successful in creating sufficiently valid and
reliable measures, we can use them to address more theoretically
ambitious questions about the reasons for and consequences of
judges' actions. For example, judges' options will sometimes be
limited by the posture in which a case reaches them, but they will
often have a good deal of freedom to choose a more or less
constraining action. Can we say anything systematic about when and
why judges opt for constraining rules in their opinions?
One natural hypothesis is that judges choose to impose more or
less constraint depending on which approach would do more to
further their policy preferences. A liberal judge who feels compelled
to decide a case in favor of the government in a criminal case or a
coal company in an environmental case might choose to announce
only a weak rule in support of the decision or, better yet, not
announce any rule at all, leaving plenty of room for other judges to
reach liberal decisions in slightly different cases. A conservative
judge deciding a case where established doctrine is liberal might elect
to grant lower court judges more discretion in applying it by
establishing an exception to the rule or redefining it to allow for a less
precise or more subjective judgment.
Alternatively, a higher court judge hoping to promote his or her
policy preferences might think more strategically about the
preferences of lower court judges and, following Jacobi and Tiller,"'
allow more discretion in areas where the preferences of the higher
and lower court judges are more consistent, and less discretion where
the judges are ideologically further apart. Or perhaps the judge might
care more about the proper guidance function of the high court than
about particular policies and act to improve the balance of constraint
and discretion where it appears to be off.
The most important question is one that this Article has largely
begged so far: To what extent does the form a precedent takes
actually matter? I have written as if we can be confident that a
judge's decision to write an opinion in a certain way will have
important consequences for decisions in other cases. But a central
truth of judging is that the set of judges who issue a precedent can
never maintain perfect control over the application of that precedent
by other judges. As Sunstein notes:
101. Tonja Jacobi & Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine and Political Control, 23 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 326, 333-40 (2007) (suggesting that a move away from highly discretionary
tests should follow from preference divergence between higher and lower courts).
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Courts deciding particular cases have limited authority over the
subsequent reach of their opinion.... A court that is
determined to be maximalist may fill its opinion with broad
pronouncements, but those pronouncements may subsequently
appear as "dicta" and be disregarded by future courts.... A
court may write a self-consciously minimalist opinion ... , but
subsequent courts may take the case to stand for a broad
principle that covers many other cases as well.
10 2
From the perspective of a high court like the Supreme Court, the
effects of its pronouncements depend very much on how lower courts
respond to them.'0 3
To begin with, note that if lower courts made no effort to apply
higher court precedents faithfully, the way in which higher courts
wrote precedent-setting cases would be irrelevant. A substantial
empirical literature suggests that lower court judges do indeed take
precedents seriously, but it does not indicate that they are always
willing to subordinate their own views to those of their institutional
superiors. 1°4 A study of decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals
by Lindquist and Cross shows one intriguing way in which a partial
commitment to compliance can play out.1 5 The authors found that
the influence of ideology on circuit judges' opinions is greater in cases
involving issues of first impression, suggesting that once the Supreme
Court speaks, circuit judges feel greater constraint.0 6 However, in an
analysis of cases in one particular area of law, the effect of ideology
began to increase after time, presumably because the profusion of
sometimes inconsistent precedents from the Supreme Court allowed
the circuit judges more flexibility to decide as they wished."0 7 As this
study demonstrates, not only do lower court judges' commitment to
compliance shape the effects of higher court decisions, but it can do
so in ways too complex to be covered in this Article.
Even where lower court judges make their best efforts to apply
precedent faithfully, higher court precedents might not have the
effects we expect. For one thing, there is no consensus in the legal
102. SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 21.
103. In fact, it can depend at least as much on the responses of many other nonjudicial
actors, such as executive officials, lawyers, and potential litigants. But exploring these
variations would require an additional article.
104. For a thorough recent overview, see generally Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court
Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (2007).
105. Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin's Chain
Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156 (2005).
106. Id. at 1184.
107. Id. at 1194-96 (analyzing cases on "color of law" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)).
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community as to how precedent is to be used and understood,
whether the job of the later judge is to follow the language in earlier
cases or to go deeper, analyzing the facts and outcomes and
discerning the principles implicit in the decisions.' Relatedly, judges
disagree about whether lower courts are bound to follow the dicta of
their superiors and, of course, about how to define dicta in the first
place. 1°9
Even compliant judges who see themselves as bound by the
language of the Court might not apply that language as its authors
imagined. As Schauer argues, there can be large gaps between how a
formulation works in theory and how it is applied in practice."
Judges attempting to apply a well defined rule may find that it leads
to absurd or otherwise unacceptable results and begin to carve out
exceptions to it."' Judges operating under a more diffuse standard,
finding that application of the weak formulation makes their jobs too
difficult, might supplement it with their own more determinate
formulations.
12
Thus, in order to know how consequential lawmaking styles in
higher courts are, we would need to know much more than we do
now about how lower courts think about and employ precedents. But
even that would not be enough, for the consequences also depend
crucially on how higher courts treat their own precedents and how
they respond to the actions of lower courts. Do they reverse lower
courts for departing from established precedents even where those
precedents diverge from the policy preferences of the current judges?
Do they expect lower court judges to honor their statements of law
and reverse them when they do not, or do they permit well reasoned
applications of underlying principles? There are also many more
subtle ways in which courts can undermine or solidify their own
precedents, a topic far too vast for me to do more than mention in
this Article." 3
108. See, e.g., Tiersma, supra note 15, at 1189 (arguing that the increasing textualization
of precedent is likely to "intensify the shift from legal reasoning to close reading"); Larry
Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1989) (discussing three
different methods of following precedent, including the "natural model," "rule model,"
and "result model" of precedent).
109. See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article 11, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2003 (1994).
110. Schauer, supra note 13, at 312.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 315-16.
113. For an important recent discussion, see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path
Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 903, 922-33 (2005) (examining five
characteristics common to constraining precedent).
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In short, there is abundant reason to question whether the way in
which judges choose to write in their opinions ultimately affects the
influence the opinions exert on other judges. With solid measures
allowing us to distinguish more and less constraining legal
formulations, we could test for effects by, for instance, seeing whether
cases decided under more constraining formulations produce higher
rates of consistency in winning rates for one type of party. In turn
this would allow us to reach firmer judgments about how much
judicial modesty-at least, of the sort under consideration here-
really matters.
